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SOCIAL MEDIA, MANIPULATION, AND VIOLENCE
Allyson Haynes Stuart ∗
For centuries now, inventions
heralded as advances in human progress
have been exploited by the criminal mind.
New technologies, all too soon, can
become instruments used to commit
serious crimes. The railroad is one
example . . . and the telephone another . .
. . So, it will be with the Internet and
social media. 1
Many of us lament the ubiquity of social media 2 and
the attention it takes from face-to-face activities,

∗ Allyson Haynes Stuart is a Professor of Law at Charleston School of
Law. She wishes to thank her research assistant, Michael Grabara, and the
editorial staff of the South Carolina Journal of International Law and
Business. This article follows the 2018 Symposium, "Innovation, Policy, &
Technology in Law and Development," where Allyson Haynes Stuart was a
featured panelist.
1 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017)
(citations omitted).
2
Social media refers to “forms of electronic communication (such as
websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users
create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages,
and other content (such as videos).”
Social Media,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM
DICTIONARY
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/social%20media. The social media websites
(“sites”) I refer to primarily are Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and
YouTube, which are also referred to as third-party platforms. See Jonathan
Peters & Brett Johnson, Conceptualizing Private Governance in A
Networked Society, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 15, 49 (2016) (“Google,
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particularly on the part of young people. Social media
generally stresses the importance of appearance, and
makes most of us believe our lives pale in comparison to
everyone else on the planet. 3 It has been linked to
depression and low self-esteem in teenagers, and no one
is completely sure of the long-term effects of small
screen use on the body and brain. 4 But this essay
addresses an even darker side to social media: its use for
manipulation on scales both small and large and its direct
and indirect ties to violence. Increasingly, social media
is used as a tool to foment violence, particularly in
regions of the world where access to the Internet is
otherwise limited. Even when a social media site is not
itself an instrument to foment violence, it may have the
effect of encouraging and validating the extreme views
that result in violence. What is the role of social media
sites in containing their use for such nefarious purposes,
and how should the law govern them? Should such sites
be liable for failing to take down misleading or

Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are examples of third-party platforms that
offer a variety of services that enable their users to share content.”).
3 Note Facebook’s recent “10 Year Challenge,” which encouraged
users to post pictures of how little they had changed in 10 years. See
Rebecca Jennings, Why You’re Seeing the 10-Year Challenge Everywhere,
VOX (Jan. 16, 2019, 5:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/thegoods/2019/1/16/18185256/10-year-challenge-facebook-meme.
4
A survey conducted by the Royal Society for Public Health of 14-24
year olds in the United Kingdom found that Snapchat, Facebook, Twitter,
and Instagram all led to increased feelings of depression, anxiety, poor body
image, and loneliness. See Rachel Ehmke, How Using Social Media Affects
Teenagers, CHILD MIND INSTITUTE, https://childmind.org/article/howusing-social-media-affects-teenagers/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
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inaccurate content or for allowing hate speech? If not,
what are other options for controlling its misuse?
I.

UBIQUITY OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE U.S. AND AROUND
THE GLOBE

In a relatively short period of time, our world has
been taken over by social media. Facebook is only fifteen
years old, but sixty-eight percent of U.S. adults and fifty
percent of U.S. teens use the social media platform.5
Additionally, around forty percent of U.S. adults get
their news from Facebook. 6 Thus, social media sites
have now surpassed print newspapers as a news source
for Americans; twenty percent of U.S. adults surveyed
say that they often get their news via social media, as
opposed to the sixteen percent who obtain their news
from print newspapers. 7
Globally, social media use has grown astoundingly.
According to the Pew Research Center, seventy-five
percent of adults in Jordan and an average of sixty-eight
percent of adults in the Middle East and North Africa

5

See John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 1, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/02/01/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/.
6 See id.
7 In 2017, the portion of U.S. adults who got news via social media
was about equal to the portion who got news from print newspapers. See
Elisa Shearer, Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a
RESEARCH
CENTER
News
Source,
PEW
(Dec. 10, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/socialmedia-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/.
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now use social media. 8 Worldwide, an average of sixty
percent of adults use social media. 9 In some countries,
social media adoption has risen dramatically in the last
few years. For example, “only forty-nine percent of
Lebanese adults used social media in 2015, but in 2017,
that number increased to seventy-two percent.” 10
Similarly, “just two years ago only fifty-one percent of
South Korean adults were on social media, compared to
almost sixty-nine percent in 2017.” 11
In certain countries, social media sites have a
monopoly status. In an extreme example, fewer than five
percent of Myanmar’s population had mobile phones
until 2014, when the government loosened restrictions
and first allowed SIM cards to be sold at affordable
levels. 12 After that, a much greater number of people
bought smartphones—and those phones were all

8

See Jacob Poushter, Caldwell Bishop & Hanyu Chwe, Social
Network Adoption Varies Widely by Country, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June
19,
2018),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/06/19/3-social-networkadoption-varies-widely-by-country/.
9 See id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12See Euan McKirdy, When Facebook Becomes ‘The Beast’:
Myanmar Activists Say Social Media Aids Genocide, CNN (Apr. 6, 2018,
8:05 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/06/asia/myanmar-facebooksocial-media-genocide-intl/index.html; See Megan Specia & Paul Mozur, A
War of Words Puts Facebook at the Center of Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis,
TIMES
N.Y.
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/asia/myanma
r-government-facebook-rohingya.html.
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preinstalled with Facebook. 13 The use of Facebook in
Myanmar went from about two million in 2014 to over
thirty million today. 14 There, Facebook “is the Internet”
and is the way most people get their news. 15 That can
have dire results when the news people receive is not
necessarily true and is being used for improper
purposes. 16
II.

THE DARK SIDE OF SOCIAL MEDIA USE

There are myriad benefits from social media, like its
use during the revolutions of the Arab Spring to put
pressure on governments and spread truth in the face of
propaganda. 17 But there are three primary problems:

13

See Specia & Mozur, supra note 12.
See id.
15 See Barbara Ortutay, Facebook Admits Not Doing Enough to
Prevent Myanmar Violence, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/6/facebook-admits-notdoing-enough-to-prevent-myanma/.
16 See infra Incitement to Violence.
17
See Kevin Gregg, “Text ‘Revolution’ to Vote”: Social Media’s Effect
on Popular Consent and Legitimacy of New Regimes, 31 B.U. INT'L L.J.
315, 334 (2013) (describing the significant role of camera-phone videos
posted on Facebook in Tunisia’s popular revolution); Kitsuron Sangsuvan,
Balancing Freedom of Speech on the Internet Under International Law, 39
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 701, 755 (2014) (“[T]he history books will
also note that 2011 marked the beginning of a new age when mass protest,
revolution and armed conflict was not only facilitated by, but made possible
through, digital communication networks and social networking sites.
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube had transformed civil society’s
engagement with, and in, warfare.”); Philip N. Howard et al., Opening
Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab
Spring?, PROJECT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL ISLAM
(2011)
(unpublished
manuscript),
14
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misleading or inaccurate stories used to influence
elections, misleading or inaccurate stories used to foment
violence, and the more tangential effect on violence that
results when people with extreme views find
amplification and validation of those views on social
media.
A. ELECTIONS

News had certain built-in safeguards when
traditional media outlets controlled its distribution.
Journalists and newspapers have reputations to protect,
in addition to incentives to avoid liability, and so they
follow safeguards that require source-vetting,
fact-checking, and backup evidence. 18 There is a level of

(https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/117568/2011_H
oward-Duffy-Freelon-Hussain-MariMazaid_PITPI.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y%20) (“Our evidence shows
that social media was used heavily to conduct political conversations by a
key demographic group in the revolution – young, urban, relatively welleducated individuals, many of whom were women. Both before and during
the revolutions, these individuals used Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to
put pressure on their governments.”).
18 See Washington Post Staff, About Us: Policies and Standards,
POST
(Jan.
1,
2016)
WASHINGTON
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ask-thepost/wp/2016/01/01/policies-andstandards/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9f3bf843b3c4 (“The Post has a
multi-level structure for the review and editing of stories that may include
fact-checking. These include assignment editors (department heads, their
deputy editors and assistant editors) who collaborate with reporters on the
origination of stories and typically provide initial review when a story is
submitted by a reporter; multiplatform editors (also called copy editors)
who often provide initial review on breaking news stories and routinely
provide second-level review on print and other less time-sensitive stories;
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reliability in traditional news outlets that is not inherent
in stories on social media. Additionally, the news sources
themselves on social media may not always be what they
appear. Russia, via its government Internet Research
Agency, uses misleading website names to suggest its
stories are coming from the U.S. rather than Russia. 19 As
they say, “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a
dog.” 20
The public has known for some time about Russia’s
interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election on
social media, but in December 2018 two expert reports
revealed a trove of details. 21 The Senate commissioned

and senior editors who have overall oversight of the daily and weekend
report for digital publication throughout the day as well as The Post’s print
editions. Editors who oversee digital platforms also may be involved in the
presentation of stories as well as headlines, news alerts and newsletters. The
number of editors who review a story prior to publication and the extent of
their involvement varies depending on a range of factors, including
complexity, sensitivity, and the pressure of time.”).
19 The website usareally.com is funded by the sponsors of the Russian
“troll factory” accused of interference in the 2016 US Presidential election.
See Russia Protests After Journalist Detained, Interrogated at DC Airport,
PRESS
(Nov.
11,
2018),
ASSOCIATED
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/11/alexandermalkevich-usa-really-editor-detained-dc-/.
20 See Michael Cavna, ‘Nobody Knows You’re A Dog’: As Iconic
Internet Cartoon Turns 20, Creator Peter Steiner Knows The Joke Rings As
Relevant As Ever, WASHINGTON POST (Jul. 31, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/comic-riffs/post/nobody-knowsyoure-a-dog-as-iconic-internet-cartoon-turns-20-creator-peter-steinerknows-the-joke-rings-as-relevant-as-ever/2013/07/31/73372600-f98d11e2-8e84c56731a202fb_blog.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6e128dc23f88.
21
One report was prepared by social media analysts New Knowledge
and the other by an Oxford University team working with analytical firm
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the expert reports as part of its bipartisan investigation of
Russian interference, and the reports are based largely on
data about the Russian operations provided to the Senate
by Facebook, Twitter, and the other companies whose
platforms were used. 22 The reports describe the ongoing
efforts of the Russian government’s Internet Research
Agency, based in St. Petersburg, Russia, to erode trust in
U.S. democratic institutions and to divide Americans by
race and extreme ideology. 23 Part of that effort included
targeting African-Americans. 24 On Facebook and
Instagram, Russians specifically targeted black
American communities using Gmail accounts with
American-sounding names to recruit and sometimes pay
unwitting American activists to stage rallies and spread
content. 25 One tactic was using Facebook ads targeted at
users who had shown interest in particular topics,
including black history, the Black Panther Party, and

Graphika. See Mark Hosenball, Russia Used Social Media for Widespread
Meddling in U.S. Politics: Reports, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2018, 2:18 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-socialmedia/russiaused-social-media-for-widespread-meddling-in-u-s-politics-reportsidUSKBN1OG257?il=0.
22 See Renee DiResta et al., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet
KNOWLEDGE,
Research
Agency,
NEW
https://disinformationreport.blob.core.windows.net/disinformationreport/NewKnowledge-Disinformation-Report-Whitepaper.pdf.
23
See Hosenball, supra note 21.
24 See Scott Shane & Sheera Frenkel, Russian 2016 Influence
Operation Targeted African-Americans on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/us/politics/russia-2016influence-campaign.html.
25 See DiResta et al., supra note 22, at 34.
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Malcolm X. 26 The most popular of the Russian
Instagram accounts was @blackstagram, with 303,663
followers, while on YouTube, the largest share of
Russian material covered the Black Lives Matter
movement and police brutality, with channels called
“Don’t Shoot” and “BlackToLive.” 27 The expert reports
revealed that, while much attention has been focused on
Facebook, the Internet Research Agency in fact created
social media accounts under fake names on virtually
every available platform, 28 with the goal of supporting
Donald J. Trump as a candidate in the Republican
primary, then in the general election, and as president
since his election. 29
In April of 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller
released his long-awaited investigative report of
Russian interference in the 2016 election. The report
further detailed the actions of the Russian troll farm
Internet Research Agency and its social media
interference dating back to 2014, including the use of
fake Facebook accounts. 30

26

See id.
See id. at 30.
28 See Shane & Frenkel, supra note 24.
29 See Craig Timberg & Tony Romm, New Report on Russian
Disinformation Prepared for the Senate, Shows the Operation’s Scale and
POST
(Dec.
17,
2018),
Sweep,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/16/new-reportrussian-disinformation-prepared-senate-shows-operations-scalesweep/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.aca9ee116e41.
30
See Dustin Volz & Allan Cullison, ‘Putin Has Won’: Mueller Report
Details the Ways Russia Interfered in the 2016 Election, Wall St. J. (Apr.
27
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Facebook plays a prominent role in an additional
social media election scandal involving Cambridge
Analytica and one of the largest data leaks in social
media history. 31 Cambridge Analytica was a voter
profiling company started in 2014 by Steve Bannon and
Robert Mercer, using a psychographics platform
developed by Christopher Wylie and Aleksandr Kogan,
that mapped personality traits based on what people liked
on Facebook. 32 The company’s goal was to develop
detailed psychological profiles of every American voter
so that campaigns could tailor their pitches from person
to person. 33 To that end, the company created an
application for Facebook with a personality quiz that
asked 120 questions about personality and behavior.34
Then, it scored people on traits like openness,
extroversion, and agreeableness, and mixed those results
with polls, voter records, and online activity in order to
create personality models for voters. 35 Users of the app

19, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-has-won-mueller-reportdetails-the-ways-russia-interfered-in-the-2016-election-11555666201.
31See Carole Cadwalladr, Nicholas Confessore & Matthew Rosenberg,
How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analyticatrump-campaign.html.
32 See id.
33 See Scott Detrow, What Did Cambridge Analytica Do During the
(Mar.
20,
2018),
2016
Election?,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/20/595338116/what-did-cambridgeanalytica-do-during-the-2016-election.
34
See id.
35 See id.
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– about 270,000 people – technically consented to
having their data harvested when they took the quiz
(including education, location, the groups and pages they
liked, their relationship status, and where they
worked). 36 But the app also gathered information from
the friends of those users, amounting to about “50
million raw profiles” that were provided to Cambridge
Analytica. 37 The company then used that data for
targeted advertisements and other election-related efforts
on behalf of conservative candidates. 38 Most notably, the
data was used to support Donald Trump in the 2016
election, when Cambridge Analytica designed target
audiences for digital advertisements and fundraising
appeals, modeled voter turnout, bought television
advertisements, and determined where then-candidate
Trump should travel to increase his support. 39
The U.S. is not alone in experiencing election
interference via social media use. 40 The democracy
advocacy group Freedom House found that at least

36

See id.; Rosenberg, supra note 31.

37 See Rosenberg, supra note 31. The app violated Facebook rules both

in gathering data for a purpose other than the research purpose that was
disclosed, and for violating a loophole in Facebook’s architecture that
allowed the app to harvest data of users who had not given permission.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See Jackie Snow, Last Year, Social Media Was Used to Influence
Elections in at Least 18 Countries, MIT TECH REV. (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/609478/last-yearsocial-media-was-used-to-influence-elections-in-at-least-18-countries/.
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seventeen other countries also had their elections
manipulated through social media throughout 2016. 41
B. INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE

Facebook has also been tied to violence in countries
where the social media platform has been used to foment
action against disfavored groups. 42 In Myanmar,
Facebook has an outsized importance because of the way
the country’s Internet use developed. 43 Until 2014, fewer
than 5% of individuals there used mobile phones because
they were prohibitively expensive. 44 That year, changes
in government policies lowered the price of SIM cards,
allowing a much greater number of people to afford
them. 45 Importantly, those mobile phones were usually
programmed to include Facebook and its messaging
application. 46 Users had little experience with the
Internet before having mobile phones, therefore for
many in Myanmar, Facebook “is the Internet.” 47 The
social media platform has been used to target the
disenfranchised Rohingya Muslim minority, which has
been the target of a sustained campaign of violence and

41

See id.
See id.
43
See McKirdy, supra note 12.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46
See id.
47 See Ortutay, supra note 15.
42
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abuse by the Myanmar military that the United Nations
calls “ethnic cleansing”. 48
Ultra-nationalist Buddhists have used Facebook to
publish hate speech and foment violence against the
Rohingya. This includes posting fake pictures of the
Muslims burning their own homes and of decaying
bodies they said were Buddhist victims of Rohingya
attacks, and using the Facebook messenger service to
forward messages warning of incoming attacks by
Muslims.49 In September 2017, the Buddhists warned of
a fabricated “jihad,” which incited a “call to arms”
against the Muslims.50 The purge of Muslims and
subsequent refugee crisis have seen 700,000 Rohingya
forced from their homes. 51
Sri Lanka is another example where there have been
instances of hate speech used against the Muslim
minority. 52 In March 2018, parts of Sri Lanka’s Central
Province experienced a wave of anti-Muslim riots, which
the government blamed on hate speech against the
Muslim community that was spread over Facebook,
WhatsApp, Instagram, and Viber. 53 There are also

48

See Specia & Mozur, supra note 12; McKirdy, supra note 12.
See Specia & Mozur, supra note 12.
50 See McKirdy, supra note 12.
51 See id.
52See Amantha Perera, Social Media – the New Testing Ground for Sri
Lanka’s Freedom, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (July 18, 2018),
http://www.ipsnews.net/2018/07/social-media-new-testing-ground-srilankas-freedom/.
53 See id.
49
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examples of people trolling journalists and using threats
to prevent them from telling the truth. 54 Between five
and six million Sri Lankans use Facebook, and research
shows that social media is the primary platform of
political interaction for Sri Lankans between eighteen
and thirty-four. 55 Misinformation, disinformation, and
threats to journalists have risen sharply. 56
In India, there are infamous examples of social media
weaponization. 57 In July 2018, a mob lynched five
people after rumors spread, via WhatsApp messages,
that these people were child abductors. 58 The victims
were poor agricultural workers from a nearby district,
who were surrounded and attacked by a crowd of about
three thousand people. 59 Earlier that week, three more
people were killed in another part of India after social
media rumors spread of child abduction and human
organ harvesting. 60 Mobs have killed people in at least
three other instances, all related to fake rumors circulated
mostly through WhatsApp groups. 61

54

See id.
See id.
56 See id.
57See generally Swati Gupta & Bard Wilkinson, WhatsApp India: Five
lynched after online child kidnap rumors, CNN (July 3, 2018, 4:37 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/02/asia/india-lynching-whatsappintl/index.html (providing examples of recent weaponization of social
media).
58 See id.
59 See id.
60
See id.
61 See id. (discussing similar mob attacks in India).
55
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Finally, to a lesser extent, conspiracy theorists have
touted their beliefs online in the U.S. and sparked
violence. In response to Alex Jones’s assertion that the
2012 Sandy Hook Elementary mass shooting was a hoax
perpetrated by gun control advocates, Mr. Jones’s
supporters harassed the grieving parents of child
victims. 62 And after the circulation of the bizarre
Pizzagate conspiracy theory, alleging that Hillary
Clinton and other Democrats were secretly running a
child-sex ring, one supporter brought an assault rifle to a
Washington, D.C. pizza restaurant, vowing to save the
children locked in the basement. 63
C. FOMENTING HATE

Aside from direct incitement of violence, social
media links to violence in more insidious ways. There is
a tie between recent shootings in the U.S. and a history
of social media radicalization. Before Cesar Sayoc
allegedly sent fourteen pipe bombs through the mail to
prominent Democrats around the country, he had
become radicalized online and was “sucked into a vortex

62 See Kevin Roose, Cesar Sayoc’s Path on Social Media: From Food
Photos to Partisan Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/technology/cesar-sayoc-facebooktwitter.html.
63 See Spencer S. Hsu, ‘Pizzagate’ Gunman Sentenced To Four Years
In Prison, As Prosecutors Urged Judge To Deter Vigilante Justice, WASH.
POST (June 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/pizzagate-gunman-sentenced-to-four-years-in-prison-asprosecutors-urged-judge-to-deter-vigilante-justice/2017/06/22/a10db598550b-11e7-ba90-f5875b7d1876_story.html?utm_term=.2d464811e9a1.
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of partisan furor.” 64 Beginning in 2016, Sayoc started
posting right-wing news stories, pro-Donald Trump
images, and stories about Muslims and the Islamic State
on Twitter and Facebook. 65 Weeks before the 2018
bombings, Sayoc had posted violent fantasies and threats
against several people to whom pipe bombs were sent,
including Democratic representatives, prominent
liberals, and Trump critics. 66 On social media he found a
home for his more strident views, including conspiracy
theories involving the Clintons, Barack Obama, George
Soros, and illegal immigration. 67 Many subjects of his
tweets were targeted with mailbombs. 68
Robert Bowers, the suspected gunman who killed 11
people at a Philadelphia synagogue, was an avid user of
the social media site Gab. 69 Unlike mainstream social

64 See Nicole Chavez, Cesar Sayoc Was a DJ, Bodybuilder and Pizza
Delivery Man Before He Became a Bomb Suspect, CNN (Oct. 27, 2018,
9:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/27/politics/cesar-sayoc-mailbomb-suspect/index.html.
65 See Julie Turkewitz & Kevin Roose, Who Is Robert Bowers, the
Suspect in the Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/robert-bowers-pittsburghsynagogue-shooter.html.
66 See Roose, supra note 62, at A20.
67 See id.
68 See Benjamin Weiser, Mail Bomb Suspect Accused of Targeting
Clinton, Obama and Other Democrats to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 2019, at A21 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/nyregion/mailbomber-cesar-sayoc.html.
69
See Becky Metrick, Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting Suspect used
Social Media Platform Created by Pa. Native, PA. REAL-TIME NEWS, (Mar.
27, 2019, 9:27 AM), https://www.pennlive.com/news/2019/03/an-
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media, Gab is infamous for allowing racist, anti-Semitic,
and bigoted comments. 70 Bowers frequently used the site
to criticize and threaten Jews; he referred to Jews as
children of Satan, and the enemy of white people. 71 He
accused Jews of aiding migrant caravan “invasions.”72
Five minutes before police were alerted to the shooting,
Bowers posted on the site: “[I] can’t sit by and watch my
people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going
in.” 73
Scott Paul Beierle killed two people and wounded
five others in a Tallahassee yoga studio before turning
the gun on himself. 74 Evidence shows that he, like Sayoc
and Bowers, bore a grudge against a certain group and
found kinship for that hatred on social media. 75 Beierle

allentown-school-administrator-shared-photos-of-minors-having-sex-andpolice-looked-the-other-way-lawsuit-says.html.
70 See Alina Selyukh, Feeling Sidelined by Mainstream Social Media,
Far-Right Users Jump to Gab, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Mar. 27, 2019, 9:25
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/05/21/529005840/fee
ling-sidelined-by-mainstream-social-media-far-right-users-jump-to-gab.
71 See Saeed Ahmed & Paul P. Murphy, Here’s What We Know So Far
About Robert Bowers, the Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting Suspect, CNN,
(Oct. 28, 2018, 7:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/27/us/synagogueattack-suspect-robert-bowers-profile/index.html.
72 See id.
73 Id.
74 See Dakin Adone & Artemis Moshtaghian, Gunman in Florida Yoga
Studio Shooting made Misogynistic Comments on Youtube, CNN, (Mar. 27,
2019, 9:36 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/03/us/tallahasseeshooting-yoga-studio/index.html.
75
See Anna North, How Mass Shooters Practice Their Hate Online,
VOX
MED.
(Nov.
3,
2018,
9:19
PM)
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made numerous racist and misogynistic comments in
Youtube videos and identified with “involuntary
celebates.” 76 He made violent comments about women
who rejected him, and he expressed sympathy toward
Elliot Roger, who killed 6 people and injured others in
Santa Barbara after posting a manifesto blaming the
cruelty of women for his own virginity. 77
In probably the worst example yet of online
extremism leading to offline violence, an Australian
man fatally shot 51 Muslim worshippers and injured 39
others at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. 78
Just before the attack, he published a link on a rightwing forum to a 74-page white supremacist manifesto. 79
He then used a camera mounted to his head to
livestream the attack on Facebook. 80 The New York
Times reported that “[t]he gunman appeared to pair the
shooting with the typical trolling tactics of the internet’s
most far-right instigators, playing to a community of

https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/10/31/18039294/scott-beierletallahassee-shooting-pittsburgh-gab.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 Charlotte Graham-McLay, Death Toll in New Zealand Mosque
2,
2019),
Shooting
Rises
to
51,
N.Y. TIMES, (May
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/world/asia/new-zealand-attackdeath-toll.html.
79 Kevin Roose, A Mass Murder of, and for, the Internet, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/technology/
facebook-youtube-christchurch-shooting.html.
80 Id.
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like-minded supporters online who cheered him on in
real time as they watched bodies pile up.” 81
While social media did not cause these individuals to
take the action they did, it provided an echo chamber for
their disturbed views, validated those views, and
encouraged hate. 82 Bowers seemed to see himself as
having an audience on social media for whom he was
performing in slaughtering people. 83 The New Zealand
shooter quoted Bowers (“screw your optics”) in a posting
before he began his own horrific live performance. 84 The
Internet did not create hate, but it has given hate a
worldwide platform.
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Social media sites themselves are increasingly
addressing the problems of manipulation and violence. 85
In addition, many countries have opted for government

81 Daniel Victor, In

Christchurch, Signs Point to a Gunman Steeped in
TIMES
(Mar.
15,
2019),
Internet
Culture,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/asia/new-zealand-gunmanchristchurch.html?action=click&module=
RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer.
82 See id.
83 See Turkewitz & Roose, supra note 65.
84 Roose, supra note 79.
85See, e.g., Alex Hern, WhatsApp to Restrict Message Forwarding
After India Mob Lynchings, GUARDIAN (July 20, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/20/whatsapp-to-limitmessage-forwarding-after-india-mob-lynchings.
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action to address online hate. 86 The action of the sites has
been criticized as doing too little, while the action of
governments has been criticized as doing too much.87
Either way, limits on “bad” speech risk censorship of
“good” speech.
A. GOVERNMENT ACTION

One solution to problematic use of social media sites
is for governments to control any such use for improper
means. 88 However, government action too often amounts
to outright censorship. 89 After the March 2018 antiMuslim riots in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan government
responded with a weeklong shutdown of Facebook,
WhatsApp, Instagram, and Viber. 90 In addition to
censorship, government action often targets social media
speech critical of its own actions. 91 The Chinese
government is infamous for Internet censorship,
imposing a system of Internet filters known as the Great

86 See e.g, Saritha Rai, India Seeks Access to Private Messages in
WhatsApp Crackdown, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2019, 6:50 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-13/india-targetsfacebook-evil-in-backlash-against-u-s-giants.
87 See generally DiResta et al., supra note 22.
88 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 17.
89 See id.
90 See Perera, supra note 52.
91
See Mirae Yang, The Collision of Social Media and Social Unrest:
Why Shutting Down Social Media Is the Wrong Response, 11 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 707, 709 (2013) (discussing Egypt’s shutdown of Internet
and cell phone service in response to civil unrest).
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Firewall to block content and shut out foreign technology
companies. 92
Now, India is accused of following that model and
proposing strong, new measures that would allow Indian
officials to demand that online platforms like Facebook
and Twitter remove posts or videos that they deem
libelous,
invasive
of
privacy,
hateful,
or
deceptive. 93 Those sites would be responsible for the
content their users share. 94 In addition, the Indian
government has cracked down on WhatsApp, by
pressing the service to provide access to encrypted
messages. 95
In the European Union, data protection laws strongly
protect users of social media, and in some instances
require companies to remove material from their sites or
scrub links to particular stories. 96 Under the “right to be

92 See Vindu Goel, India Proposes Chinese-Style Internet Censorship,
(Feb.
14,
2019),
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/technology/india-internetcensorship.html?smid=tw-nytimesbits&smtyp=cur.
93 See id.
94
See Rai, supra note 86 (draft published on the government’s website
suggests the guidelines would hold these services responsible for a broad
range of content, including information found to be “blasphemous,
defamatory, obscene, pornographic, pedophilic, libelous, invasive of
another’s privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically objectionable, disparaging,
relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise
unlawful in any manner whatever”).
95 See id.; See also Goel, supra note 92.
96 See Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (General Data
Protection Directive Regulation or “GDPR”); Directive 95/46/EC, art. 12,
1995 O.J. (L 281).
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forgotten,” citizens have a right to their own personal
information, and the right to demand that data be deleted
when it is no longer necessary for the legitimate purposes
for which it was gathered. 97 Google, which is the search
engine used by a whopping 95% of Europeans, was first
ordered to take down links in Spain in May 2014, 98 and
has since been asked to delete links to 2.9 million
websites. 99 The right to be forgotten or “right to erasure”
was enshrined in the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), which went into effect in 2018. 100
Even if we wanted this kind of control over Internet
speech in the U.S., such action would likely be deemed
unconstitutional. Protection of free speech in the U.S. is
“unparalleled elsewhere in the world.” 101 The U.S.
Supreme Court has specifically acknowledged the
importance of free speech on social media websites such

97

Id. (Under the GDPR, an EU citizen has the right to demand that an
organization erases her personal data if, among other reasons, the data is no
longer relevant to the reason it was collected or if she withdraws consent to
the data being used. This right is limited, for example, by the organization’s
right to freedom of expression and if the data is in the public interest.)
98 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de
Proteccion de Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317.
99 See id.; Google Wins Bout in Fight Against ‘Right to Be Forgotten’,
(Jan.
11,
2019,
6:49
AM),
LIVEMINT
https://www.livemint.com/Companies/tUyyXERKejWs08dnovzFJM/Goo
gle-can-limit-right-to-be-forgotten-to-EU-Top-court-ad.html (France has
unsuccessfully attempted to globalize the EU’s orders that Google delete
links.)
100 See GDPR Art. 17, Part 1, Right to Erasure (2018)
https://www.gdpreu.org/the-regulation/list-of-data-rights/right-to-erasure/.
101
Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Balancing Freedom of Speech on the Internet
Under International Law, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 701, 716 (2014).
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as Facebook. 102 The Court interprets the First
Amendment to require that any content-based
restrictions on speech will be presumed invalid, and the
government has the burden of showing those restrictions
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest. 103 Although the First Amendment provides less
protection to obscenity, defamation, and threats of
violence, it would certainly protect speech that is true but
“no longer necessary” as the GDPR would condemn. 104
In addition, U.S. law protects social media websites
from any liability based on what others post to those
sites. Since passage of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA), social media and other sites have
been immunized from liability based on content
provided by a third party. 105 Section 230 of the CDA
protects Internet providers and Internet-related services

102 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)
(“While in the past there may have been difficulty identifying the most
important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the
answer is clear. It is cyberspace – the ‘vast democratic forums of the
Internet’ in general, and social media in particular. . . . One of the most
popular of these sites is Facebook . . .”).
103 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
104
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992)
(noting that “these areas of speech can, consistently with the First
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech
entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles
for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable
content. Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the
further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the
government.”).
105 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
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— such as social media platforms 106 — by prohibiting
those platforms from being treated as “the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.” 107 The Section
establishes federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make a social media site liable for information
originating from a third-party user, even when the
platform has actual knowledge of harmful content. 108
Because of this immunity, any legal challenges to the
way social media sites control their content would likely

106 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (including

a listserv email newsletter sent by a website operator within the definition
of interactive computer service); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a matchmaking and dating
website is an interactive computer service); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 330 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that America Online fell
within the definition of interactive service provider); Klayman v.
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Facebook qualifies as
interactive computer service because it “provides information to ‘multiple
users’ by giving them ‘computer access…to a computer server’…namely
the servers that host social networking websites.” (quoting 47 U.S.C. §
230(f)(2) (2012))).
107 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
108
See id. at § 230(c)(1); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1358 (The immunity
is contingent on three conditions: (1) the party seeking immunity is a
“provider or user of an interactive computer service”; (2) the claim treats
the party seeking immunity “as the publisher or speaker” of the disputed
content; and (3) the claim is based on content produced “by another
information content provider.”; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (Alternatively,
providers cannot claim immunity when an action arises out of content the
ICSP produced itself. However, a service’s capability to control or remove
content posted on their social media website does not void its immunity.)
This incentivizes services to willingly regulate and improve their content
while keeping their protection intact.
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require legislative changes. 109 Recently, Congress has
focused on problems posed by unchecked use of social
media. Legislators have introduced several bills in
Congress and in states like California that would increase
privacy protections for users of social media in light of
the Cambridge Analytica scandal. 110 Specifically,
Congress seems increasingly willing to weaken the
immunity granted to social media sites under the
CDA. 111 In April 2018, a new law went into effect that
limits the immunity provided under CDA Section 230 for
online services that knowingly host third-party content
to promote or facilitate sex trafficking. 112 The law
removes CDA immunity for those online platforms with
respect to state criminal charges if the conduct
underlying the state violation would constitute a

109

See id.
See Customer Online Notification for Stopping Edge-Provider
Network Transgressions (“CONSENT Act”), S. 2639, 115th Cong. (2018)
(requiring websites to notify customers about the collection, use, and
sharing of sensitive customer proprietary information of the customer, and
to obtain opt-in consent to use, share, or sell the sensitive information of
customer); Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of
2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019) (requiring online platform operators to
inform a user, prior to a user creating an account or otherwise using the
platform, that the user's personal data produced during online behavior will
be collected and used by the operator and third parties, along with the option
to specify privacy preferences, and requiring notification within 72 hours
violation of a user’s data security); Assembly 288, 2018-2019 Sess. (Cal.
2019) (requiring social media companies to allow users to have their
personally identifiable information permanently removed from the
company’s database and records upon closing of their accounts).
111 See 47 U.S.C. § 230, supra note 105.
112 See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
of 2017 (“FOSTA”), H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2017).
110
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violation of anti sex-trafficking statutes; the law removes
immunity for FOSTA-related civil suits brought by
victims against online services that knowingly promote
or facilitate sex trafficking through such activities as
hosting third-party posts, listings and advertisements. 113
At a July 2018 hearing in the House Judiciary
Committee on social media filtering practices, a
Congressman suggested to representatives of Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube that further exceptions to CDA
immunity could be in the works. 114 At a hearing in
December 2018 on Google’s business practices,
Congress members criticized the broad protections that
Section 230 provides to platforms such as Google.115
One bill has been introduced that would remove Section
230 immunity when social media companies use
algorithms to alter and filter content. 116

113 See Jeffrey Neuburger, FOSTA Signed into Law, Amends CDA
Section 230 to Allow Enforcement Against Online Providers for Knowingly
Facilitating Sex Trafficking, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA AND TECH. L. BLOG
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2018/04/11/fostasigned-into-law-amends-cda-section-230-to-allow-enforcement-againstonline-providers-for-knowingly-facilitating-sex-trafficking/.
114 See Issie Lapowski, Lawmakers Don’t Grasp the Sacred Tech Law
They Want to Gut, WIRED (July 17, 2018, 5:47 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/lawmakers-dont-grasp-section-230/.
115 See Jeff Kosseff, Congress Could Still Break the Internet. Here’s
TECH.
(Dec.
17,
2018),
How
(Opinion),
GOV’T
http://www.govtech.com/policy/Congress-Could-Still-Break-the-InternetHeres-How-Opinion.html.
116 See Biased Algorithm Deterrence Act of 2019, H.R. 492, 116th
Cong. (2019). Based on the press release accompanying the bill’s
introduction, its primary purpose is to counter alleged social media bias
against conservative views. See Press Release, Louie Gohmert, Member,
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There are many problems associated with limiting
social media sites’ immunity. The CDA has been widely
credited with allowing the Internet to flourish and
changing website immunity from liability risks selfcensorship and suppression of lawful speech. 117
B. ACTION BY SOCIAL MEDIA SITES

The most obvious solution to misuse of social media
is for those sites themselves to crack down on misuse in
the form of manipulation and hate speech, although this
too comes with risks to free expression. 118 While the
sites have community standards and guidelines for use,

U.S. House of Representatives, Gohmert Statement on Bill that Removes
Liability Protections for Social Media Companies (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://gohmert.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3986
76.
117
See Jonathan Zittrain, CDA 230 Then and Now: Does Intermediary
Immunity Keep the Rest of Us Healthy? (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://blogs.harvard.edu/jzwrites/2018/08/31/cda-230-then-and-now/ (The
Internet’s development over the past twenty years has benefited
immeasurably from the immunities conferred by Section 230. We’ve been
lucky to have it. But any honest account must acknowledge the collateral
damage it has permitted to be visited upon real people whose reputations,
privacy, and dignity have been hurt in ways that defy redress. Especially as
that damage becomes more systematized – now part of organized
campaigns to shame people into silence online for expressing opinions that
don’t fit an aggressor’s propaganda aims – platforms’ failures to moderate
become more costly, both to targets of harassment and to everyone else
denied exposure to honestly-held ideas.).
118
While social media sites are not bound by constitutional restrictions
on government action, they have been likened to public spaces where
restrictions on free speech should be prohibited. See Colby M. Everett, Free
Speech on Privately-Owned Fora: A Discussion on Speech Freedoms and
Policy for Social Media, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 127, (2018)
(“Social media is a modern-age public forum.”).
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and respond to complaints by, in some instances, taking
down posts or banning users from their sites, these
measures are often not enough to prevent manipulation
and violence. 119
Some sites have acknowledged as much and made
recent efforts to do better, particularly in response to the
violence that has resulted in Myanmar and India. In July
2018, Facebook pledged that it would begin removing
information in Myanmar that could lead to people being
physically harmed. 120 In August of that year, Facebook
banned Myanmar’s military chief and nineteen other
individuals and organizations from the network in order
to prevent the hate speech and propaganda. 121 And three
months later, Facebook admitted it did not do enough to
prevent the violence and hate speech in Myanmar,
vowing to “do more” to protect human rights. 122 In
India, WhatsApp attempted to crack down on the viral
spread of misinformation through its service by limiting
the ability to forward messages to only twenty people.123
In the U.S., Facebook removed the account of
suspect Cesar Sayoc, but only after the story emerged of

119
See Everett, at 120–21 (“Social media websites utilize community
guidelines and moderation to retain users and protect business interests.
These websites outsource a vast majority of moderation to armies of
overseas contractors who screen flagged information and make judgment
calls based on guideline compliance. The rest is left to algorithms.”).
120 See Frenkel, supra note 24.
121 See Ortutay, supra note 15.
122
See id.
123 See Hern, supra note 85.
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Sayoc’s mailing of pipe bombs. 124 A Facebook
representative said that several of Sayoc’s previous posts
violated Facebook’s community standards and had been
removed before his arrest but that none of his posts,
reported to or discovered by Facebook, contained
violations of its rules severe enough to remove the
account entirely. 125 And while a political commentator
had complained to Twitter about Sayoc’s threats to her
prior to his sending the pipe bombs, Twitter had said he
had not violated their rules against abuse. 126
Criticism prompted by the livestreamed New
Zealand shooting led to Facebook’s institution of
measures to limit livestreaming 127 and to combat use of
its site by white nationalists. 128 On March 27, 2019,
Facebook announced that it was imposing “a ban on

124 See Jason Hanna, Evan Perez, Scott Glover, Steve Almasy & Ray
Sanchez, Bomb Suspect Arrest: What We Know About Cesar Sayoc, CNN
Politics
(Oct.
26,
2018,
10:56
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/26/politics/suspicious-packagesarrest/index.html.
125 See id.
126
See Donie O’Sullivan, Bomb Suspect Threatened People on
Twitter, and Twitter Didn’t Act, CNN (Oct. 27, 2018, 10:12 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/26/tech/cesar-sayoc-twitterresponse/index.html.
127 See Heather Kelly, Facebook Changes Livestream Rules After New
Zealand
Shooting,
CNN
(May
15,
2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/14/tech/facebook-livestreamchanges/index.html.
128
Facebook
Newsroom,
Mar.
27,
2019,
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/standing-against-hate/.
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praise, support and representation of white nationalism
and white separatism on Facebook and Instagram.” 129
After criticism that it was becoming a hub for “nutcase” conspiracy theories, YouTube began appending
Wikipedia blurbs to videos espousing such theories and
began giving priority to reliable news sources over
partisans in search results for breaking news stories.130
Next, YouTube announced it was changing its
recommendations algorithm to reduce the spread of
“borderline content and content that could misinform
users in harmful ways.” 131 Most recently, YouTube
announced plans to remove videos and channels “that
advocate neo-Nazism, white supremacy and other
bigoted ideologies in an attempt to clean up extremism
and hate speech” on its service. 132
In an extreme case, a social media site that does not
control hate speech may find itself closed off from the
Internet altogether. After the Pittsburg synagogue
shooting and revelations that the suspected gunman used
the social network site Gab to threaten Jews, numerous

129

Id.
See Kevin Roose, YouTube Unleased a Conspiracy Theory, N.Y.
(Mar.
26,
2018,
6:30
PM),
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/technology/youtube-conspiracystars.html.
131 See id.
132 Kevin Roose & Kate Conger, YouTube to Remove Thousands of
Videos Pushing Extreme Views, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/business/youtube-removeextremist-videos.html.
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Internet infrastructure providers, including payment
processing firm Paypal, hosting service Joyent, domain
register Godaddy, and numerous app stores, banned the
site. 133 Paypal explained its decision by stating that it
would not affiliate with a site that “explicitly allow[s] the
perpetuation of hate, violence or discriminatory
intolerance.” 134 A similar fate befell the neo-Nazi
website Daily Stormer after the violence during a white
supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. 135
C. FURTHER ACTION

There are enormous difficulties in policing speech on
social media sites like Facebook, because the site must
respond to users who have customs that are unfamiliar to
Facebook employees and who speak in varying
dialects. 136 But social media sites should continue to “do
more.” Facebook needs to ensure that it has the
manpower and knowledge to do the reviewing of content
that it promises in its community standards. 137 Social
media sites should continue to tweak algorithms and
recommendations to favor verifiable news over false
news and conspiracy theories, so as not to add to the

133

See Ivana Kottasova & Sara Ashley O’Brien, Gab, the Social
Network Used by the Pittsburgh Suspect, Has Been Taken Offline, Cnn:
Business
(Oct.
29,
2018,
12:00
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/29/tech/gab-offline-pittsburgh/index.html.
134 Id.
135
See Everett, supra note 118 at 114. (2018).
136 See McKirdy, supra note 12 (noting the difficulty Facebook faces
in monitoring the rise of hate speech in Myanmar because of language
difficulties).
137
See
Facebook
Community
Standards,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2019).
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problem when the false stories trend. Adding disclaimers
next to false stories is a good step.
Second, government should continue to step in when
social media manipulation equates to foreign
interference in elections. The U.S. should make election
interference a priority of foreign policy diplomacy,
attempt to negotiate cross-border prosecution of
offenders, or enter treaties where members promise not
to use cyber election interference.
Third, hand in hand with its engagement abroad,
government must cooperate with the technology industry
and social media websites themselves in finding
solutions. Congress can work with Facebook and other
sites to make progress on these issues without stifling
Internet speech or enacting technological solutions that
will be quickly obsolete. New Zealand’s Prime Minister
has issued a “Christchurch Call,” an effort to enlist
companies like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to do
more to curb violent and extremist content.138 Seventeen
countries, the European Commission, and eight large
technology companies have signed onto the call. 139
Finally, one solution will be self-enacting. With
time, social media users should become more Internet-

138 See Jamie Tarabay, As New Zealand Fights Online Hate, the
Internet’s Darkest Corners Resist, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/world/asia/new-zealandinternet.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_190706?campaign_id=2
&instance_id=10726&segment_id=14968&user_id=4022f9f0b977acdc8bf
6eb8211796809&regi_id=555121730706. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern
also responded to the Christchurch shootings by refusing to utter the
shooter’s name, banning the sharing or viewing of the shooter’s manifesto,
and tightening gun laws.
139 Id.
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savvy, particularly in areas where Internet use is still
developing. Additionally, monopolies on users’ social
media attention should break down, as we already see
users abandoning Facebook in favor of sites like
Snapchat. And with time, more content can be developed
to drown out untruthful or hateful content.
IV. CONCLUSION

Social media is here to stay, and with it come true
dangers as well as benefits. The 2016 presidential
election has shown us that our social media sites can be
used to taint the very basis of our democracy – our
election system. Violence in India and Myanmar has
erupted in direct response to false stories that could only
be spread with such speed and breadth via social media
sites. And other violence, like mass shootings, can be
tied directly to social media sites where troubled
individuals find like-minded peers and fan the flames of
hate and derangement. These problems must be
addressed by social media sites and by the government,
but with care not to destroy the freedom of speech that
social media epitomizes. As the Supreme Court noted in
2017, new technologies will be exploited for criminal
means. The solution includes improving the technology,
not destroying it.

